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Abstract:  Experimental evidence suggests the size of the foregone outside option of the first 
mover does not affect the behavior of the second mover in the lost wallet game. In this paper 
we experimentally compare the behavior of subjects when they face an outside option with 
unequal payoffs, i.e., the first mover gets 10 and the second mover gets 0, and when they face 
an outside option with equal payoffs, i.e., both get 5. Consistent with the most of the literature 
we do not find a significant difference in behavior of second movers. 
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Unequal Outside Options in the Lost Wallet Game  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The experimental studies of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Brandts, et al. (2006) 
have produced unexpected and counterintuitive results which demonstrate that the size of the 
foregone outside option by the first mover does not affect the behavior of the second mover in 
the lost wallet and pie sharing games. Some of the prominent reciprocity models predict a 
different outcome. For example, in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006) the first mover is perceived to be kinder if he forgoes a larger outside 
option because he bears a potentially higher cost. If the second mover is reciprocal, this 
should be sufficient to induce him to return a higher amount of money to the first mover. 
Similarly, the theory of psychological forward induction (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)) 
predicts that the second mover will believe that the first mover expects to receive more the 
higher the forgone outside option is. On the top of that if the second mover is also guilt-averse 
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)) he will return a higher amount of money as well. 
The absence of a behavioral effect of the alternative that has not been chosen is 
puzzling. This is exaggerated by the fact that the same behavior is not observed uniformly 
across games. For example, Charness and Rabin (2002) observe that the second mover’s 
behavior is influenced by the alternatives available to the first mover in a sequential game 
involving an element of trust, similar to the lost wallet and pie sharing games. In a slightly 
different experimental setting of a mini-ultimatum game Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk, et al. 
(2003), and Cox and Deck (2005) find that the reference point significantly affects the 
negatively reciprocal behavior of subjects. Brandts, et al. (2006) conjecture that the lack of 
effect is due to the outside option in their setting being perceived as unfair because everything 
is given to the first mover. This is also the case in the implementation of outside options in the 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) study. Because fairness is a relative term which could be 
contextual, in this paper we replace the notion of fairness with the notion of payoff inequality 
and explore whether it has implications for subjects’ behavior in the lost wallet game.
 1 
 
                                                 
1 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for fairness based models of behavior and 
Kahneman, et al. (1986) for context dependence.  
 
4
2. Inequality of Outside Options 
Brandts,  et al. (2006) raise a potentially important point that the relative payoff 
inequality of the outside option might play a role in the decision-making process of the second 
mover. Consider the lost wallet game in which the first mover decides to either choose IN, 
allowing the second mover to split a surplus between himself and the first mover; or to choose 
OUT and collect the outside option (x1, x2), where x1 is the payoff to the first mover and x2 is 
the payoff to the second mover. If people care strongly about equality of payoffs then they 
may consider actions leading to equal outcomes more strongly than those leading to unequal 
outcomes. Based on this reasoning one could imagine that if the outside option payoffs are 
unequal then the second mover may not consider them to be forgone by the first mover and 
strike them from his own considerations when called upon to play. On the other hand, an 
outside option with equal payoffs may appear as a more reasonable way to end the game for 
the first mover and therefore the second mover might take it into account when making his 
decision.  
Unequal outside options may be responsible for some of the intriguing results reported 
in the literature (Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Brandts, et al. (2006), Cox, et al. 
(forthcoming)). Take Dufwenberg and Gneezy as an example. In their lost wallet game 
experiment they vary the outside option, x1, of the first mover to be 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16, while 
keeping the outside option payoff of the second mover, x2, to be 0. Because in all of their 
treatments the outside option payoffs are unequal, then the second mover could perceive all 
outside options in the same or similar way. Indeed, Dufwenberg and Gneezy do not find any 
correlation between x1 and the amount given to the first mover. Moreover, the amount given 
to the first mover does not vary between treatments. 
However, it is important to note that not all evidence from lost wallet game 
experiments supports invariance to outside options. Charness, et al. (2007) find a modest 
relationship between the size of the outside option available to the first mover and the 
decision of the second mover in an experiment conducted over the internet using a within 
subjects design and the strategy method. Due to their choice of procedures it remains unclear 
as to how the combination of the strategy method and a within subjects design impact upon 
the results.
2 We think that in this particular scenario such a combination can be prone to 
producing a monotonic relationship between the variables of interest. Hence, we avoid using a 
within subjects design in our experiment.  
                                                 
2 Cox, et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate that the use of strategy method (and the saliency of the outside option) is 
not responsible for the second mover’s split being independent of x1.  
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3. The Experiment 
Our experiment consists of two treatments implemented in an across-subject design. In 
both treatments the subjects play the lost wallet game presented in Figure 1. The first mover 
chooses IN or OUT. If he chooses OUT, the game ends. The first mover receives $10 ($5) and 
the second mover receives $0 ($5). If the first mover chooses IN, the game continues. The 
second mover then chooses how to split $20 between the two of them. That is, the second 
mover chooses how much of $20 to give to the first mover, y, and how much of it to keep, 20 
– y. The second mover’s choice determines the final payoffs. In the experiment we keep the 
total outside option pie constant at 10 in order to avoid a possible confounding effect causing 
subjects to behave differently because there is a different amount of money on the table. 
 
Figure 1. The Lost Wallet Game 
 
The predicted behavior can vary between the two treatments for a number of already 
mentioned reasons and we do not want to favor any of them. However, let us use the notion of 
psychological forward induction to illustrate the possible effect of inequality of the outside 
option payoffs in our experiment. If the first mover forgoes his outside option x1 this indicates 
to the second mover that his opponent expects y ≥ x1 in the chosen subgame. If the second 
mover cares about the first mover’s expectations, e.g., if he is guilt-averse, then he should 
return at least x1. This implies that the second mover would return more in the 10,0 treatment 
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important consideration for the second mover then he could return less in the 10,0 treatment 
than in the 5,5 treatment. 
 
3.1 Procedures 
Four sessions were conducted in August 2009 at the University of Canterbury in New 
Zealand. A total of 26 subject pairs participated in each treatment. Most of the students had 
previously participated in economics experiments, but not in any type of trust games. On 
average, a session lasted about 35 minutes. Subjects earned on average 12.60 New Zealand 
dollars (NZD) including a 5 NZD show up fee.
3 All sessions were run manually under single 
blind protocol using the strategy method. 
The participants were randomly and anonymously matched into pairs that consisted of 
a Group A person (the first mover) and a Group B person (the second mover). The assignment 
into the two groups was done according to the following process. The classroom was 
segmented in half such that all subjects from a given group would be located in the same half 
of the room. The desks for each type were arranged in two rows facing the wall, and thus 
neither group would be able to see the other when making decisions. The subjects were free to 
choose any seat upon entering the classroom. Once everyone was seated, a coin was publicly 
flipped to determine which side of the room was to be which group. The matching of subjects 
to a particular pair was done by the experimenter according to a preassigned seating protocol. 
This was unknown to the subjects.  
Each subject was provided a hard copy of instructions and decision sheets all of which 
were also read aloud and projected on a screen. The subjects were encouraged to ask 
questions. All questions were asked and answered privately. At no time during the experiment 
was there direct interaction. Subjects recorded their decisions on the provided decision sheets. 
In order to transfer information between matched pairs, the experimenter collected all 
decision sheets, copied the decisions from one sheet to another, and then redistributed the 
sheets to the subjects to inform them about their experimental payoffs. Upon completion of 
the experiment all subjects were paid privately and individually. 
 
3.2 Results 
  Figure 2 presents the summary of data for both treatments. Treatment 10,0 is displayed 
on the left and treatment 5,5 on the right. Not surprisingly, 19 out of 26 (73%) first movers 
chose OUT when the outside option was 10,0 in comparison to 6 out of 26 (23%) when the 
                                                 
3 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was 12 NZD per hour.  
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outside option was 5,5. The 2-sided Fisher exact test detects that the difference in behavior of 
first movers is statistically significant (p = 0.001). 
  Turning to decisions of the second movers in our data, we observe that the second 
movers chose on average y = 6.12 and y = 5.19 in 10,0 and 5,5 treatments, respectively. In 
order to assess the qualitative difference in the data, we test a hypothesis that the choices of y 
are the same in both treatments. The 2-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test reports that the 
difference in second movers’ choices is not significant (p = 0.49). The result that the two 
samples do not differ is also supported by the 2-sided Median test (p = 0.267). Hence, we 
conclude that the inequality of outside option payoffs did not affect the behavior of second 
movers in the lost wallet game. 
 
 
Figure 2. Subjects’ Behavior in the Experiment 
 
M e d i a n   =   8        M e d i a n   =   5     
  Standard  deviation  =  5.48      Standard  deviation  =  4.11 
 
4. Discussion 
  In this paper we try to address the question of whether the second mover regards the 
forgone outside option by the first mover differently when it gives everything to the first 
mover and zero to the second mover. Based on our data we conclude that it is not the 
inequality which could be responsible for this effect and support the previous findings of 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Cox, et al (forthcoming). The result is consistent with  
 
8
Cox, et al. (2007) and Cox, et al. (2008) who model reciprocity based on what is the maximal 
available payoff to the second mover following the first mover’s action. From that 
perspective, the size of the forgone outside option is irrelevant, as observed in our experiment. 
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(10, 0 Treatment) 
 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in the 
experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group A and Group B.   
 
Anonymity  
Each person in Group A will be randomly paired with a person in Group B.  No one will learn 




Your ID number will be written at the top of your decision sheet. The experimenters will keep 
track of your decisions and your paired person’s decisions by your ID numbers. 
 
The Group A Decision Task 
Each Group A person will indicate whether (s)he wishes to choose IN or OUT. If (s)he 
chooses OUT, the Group A person receives $10 and the paired Group B person receives $0. 
 
The Group B Decision Task 
If the Group A person chooses IN, then $20 will be made available to split between the two 
paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group B person. Each Group B person 
will be asked to decide how much money out of $20 to give to the Group A person with 
whom (s)he is paired. The Group B persons are asked to write their decisions on Group B 
decision forms. Note that this decision by the Group B person will be relevant only if the 
Group A person chose IN. 
 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, the experimenters will collect the decision 
forms and calculate the payoffs. Then you will be asked one by one to approach the 
experimenters in the hallway for the payment of show up fees and your earnings from the 
game. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision nor 
your earnings either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to leave using the stairs 
and not gather in front of the elevator after you receive your payment. 
 





GROUP A PERSON DECISION FORM 
 
 





(1) I choose OUT  
 







(2) I choose IN  
 
(i.e., $20 will be made available to split between the two paired persons. The split will be 
determined by the Group B person.)  
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GROUP B PERSON DECISION FORM 
 
 
The Group B person makes his/her decision how much money out of $20 to give to the Group 










(5, 5 Treatment) 
 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk.  If you have a question after 
we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Show up Fee 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee, and in addition you may earn money in the 
experiment. All the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
Two Groups 
You will be divided randomly into two groups, called Group A and Group B.   
 
Anonymity  
Each person in Group A will be randomly paired with a person in Group B.  No one will learn 




Your ID number will be written at the top of your decision sheet. The experimenters will keep 
track of your decisions and your paired person’s decisions by your ID numbers. 
 
The Group A Decision Task 
Each Group A person will indicate whether (s)he wishes to choose IN or OUT. If (s)he 
chooses OUT, the Group A person receives $5 and the paired Group B person receives $5. 
 
The Group B Decision Task 
If the Group A person chooses IN, then $20 will be made available to split between the two 
paired persons. The split will be determined by the Group B person. Each Group B person 
will be asked to decide how much money out of $20 to give to the Group A person with 
whom (s)he is paired. The Group B persons are asked to write their decisions on Group B 
decision forms. Note that this decision by the Group B person will be relevant only if the 
Group A person chose IN. 
 
Payment of Show up Fees and Experiment Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, the experimenters will collect the decision 
forms and calculate the payoffs. Then you will be asked one by one to approach the 
experimenters in the hallway for the payment of show up fees and your earnings from the 
game. Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision nor 
your earnings either during or after the experiment. We also ask you to leave using the stairs 
and not gather in front of the elevator after you receive your payment. 
 









The Group A person makes his/her decision by circling (1) or (2): 
 
 
(1) I choose OUT  
 







(2) I choose IN  
 
(i.e., $20 will be made available to split between the two paired persons. The split will be 
determined by the Group B person.)  
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GROUP B PERSON DECISION FORM 
 
 
The Group B person makes his/her decision how much money out of $20 to give to the Group 




I choose to give $_____________ to the paired Group A person. 
 
 
 
 